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Interpreting the Syria vote: three ways parliamentary war powers shape British foreign policy 
JAMES STRONG* 
On 29 August 2013 the House of Commons met to consider British intervention in the Syrian 
civil war. Prime Minister David Cameron asked MPs to approve air strikes against the 
embattled Assad regime in response to a chemical attack on civilians in Damascus nine days 
before. Dramatically, and unexpectedly, they refused. Cameron became the first prime 
minister to lose a parliamentary vote on military action since Lord North in 1782. President 
Obama, having lost his main ally, postponed US action indefinitely. British domestic opinion 
opposed involvement in another Middle Eastern conflict. Both the public and the press 
doubted the efficacy of military action following years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
after watching post-Gaddafi Libya sliding into chaos. Several observers heralded 
parliament’s veto as a victory for democracy, and a triumph of common sense. What the veto 
means in the longer term, however, remains under-researched. 
{1}Two major ambiguities still attach to this episode in respect of parliament’s war powers. 
The first ambiguity is procedural. We can speak with more certainty about what 
parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions is not than we can about what it 
is. First, it is not a legal requirement. The historic royal prerogative grants prime ministers the 
power to direct the armed forces without recourse to parliament.
1
 It is at most a political 
convention. Any future prime minister who chooses not to permit a parliamentary vote on 
military action may face political retribution, but they will not be breaking any laws.
2
 Second, 
parliament has no power of initiative. MPs cannot start military operations. They can only 
prevent them. Third, parliament does not get involved with every military deployment. MPs 
neither seriously demanded nor obtained a say over non-combat missions to Mali in 2013 or 
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to West Africa during the Ebola crisis. They seem primarily concerned with major operations 
involving the clear expectation that British troops will face and/or use deadly force. Finally, 
there are no set standards for the information MPs should receive before considering a 
military deployment decision. 
The second ambiguity relates to the Syria vote’s broader substantive significance for British 
foreign policy. In its immediate aftermath, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 
predicted a moment of ‘national soul searching’ about the country’s role in the world.3 For its 
part, the Financial Times warned that ‘when France and Denmark are keener to use force . . . 
it is hard not to fear for Britain’s future as a global actor’.4 Britain nevertheless remains a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, a valued ally of the United States and a 
substantial military (including nuclear) power. It joined US efforts in Iraq against the 
organization known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in September 2014, for example. 
That said, the United States notably did not wait for Britain before returning to Iraq, and a 
subsequent parliamentary report labelled the RAF’s contribution ‘strikingly modest’.5  
There are several possible ways of understanding parliament’s war powers, and of trying to 
clarify these two ambiguities. From a procedural perspective, we could employ the 
‘differentiated polity model’ of British political decision-making, noting how informal 
coalition-building matters more than formal processes.
6
 From a more substantive perspective, 
we might look to the literature on how domestic publics constrain foreign policy. This article 
pursues the substantive dimension using an interpretative approach.
7
 It seeks to understand 
the implications of parliamentary war powers by listening to MPs themselves. It consequently 
presents a detailed analysis of the debate immediately preceding the Syria vote, aiming to 
draw out key themes that illuminate both the specific dynamics at work on that occasion and 
their general implications for British foreign policy. 
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A close reading of the debate generated three distinct interpretations, presented in turn below. 
The first interpretation treats the House of Commons as a site for ‘domestic role 
contestation’.8 Many MPs considered whether to intervene in Syria in light of their views on 
Britain’s role in international society. This highlighted divisions among political elites over 
exactly what sort of stance Britain should adopt. The second interpretation sees the House of 
Commons as a forum for policy debate, where MPs exercise ‘practical judgement’ about 
foreign policy.
9
 MPs debated military deployments for decades before Syria, but their views 
generally did not directly affect decision-making.
10
 The third interpretation frames the House 
of Commons as an arena for political bargaining. The Cameron government needed not only 
to win the argument over Syria, but also to win the vote. The two goals were not directly 
linked. 
These interpretations do not necessarily encompass every possible way in which 
parliamentary involvement in military deployments affects British foreign policy. They do, 
however, highlight three key parliamentary dynamics surrounding the Syria vote, each of 
which has potential longer-term consequences. Parliamentary contestation both democratizes 
and challenges the process by which Britain adopts particular roles in the world. Parliament’s 
willingness to debate the specific merits of individual military actions could well improve the 
quality of government decision-making. Prime ministers know they have to justify military 
action in the face of critical questioning from well-informed, authoritative and potentially 
powerful political actors. That should force them to think more systematically about 
deployments before committing to a vote. At the same time, however, giving parliament a 
chance to second-guess the executive, publicly, introduces undesirable inconsistency into 
Britain’s external stance; and the fact that MPs publicly dispute whether it should give 
military support to the United States detracts from its status as ‘first ally’. The political 
dimension can also have both positive and negative effects. Governments able to point to 
broad elite backing for their policies should be better able to implement even contentious 
decisions than their predecessors who were not required to win parliamentary support. But, as 
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David Cameron found over Syria, winning a vote requires political compromises, while 
holding the line politically can make it harder to get the use of force approved.  
Parliament as a site for role contestation 
Several participants in the Syria debate referred, at least indirectly, to fairly general ideas 
about Britain’s ‘role’ in the world. It makes sense to begin by interpreting these comments 
using ‘role theory’. Kalevi Holsti first suggested that the attitudes, decisions and actions 
taken by foreign policy leaders derive from internal, domestic ‘national role conceptions’.11 
Later scholars highlighted the additional importance of external, foreign ‘role expectations’,12 
and noted how both can vary according to circumstance.
13
 At the international level, former 
colonies and potential rivals regularly downplay Britain’s claim to global leadership,14 while 
powerful allies on both sides of the Atlantic still expect it to play the part of a ‘Great 
Power’.15 At the domestic level, British policy-makers claim several different international 
roles. Gaskarth highlighted six distinct conceptions emerging from leaders’ rhetoric: ‘isolate, 
regional partner, influential (rule of law state), thought leader, opportunist–interventionist and 
Great Power’.16 This proliferation can be problematic. The claims and implications attaching 
to different role conceptions can clash, a phenomenon known as ‘role conflict’.17 Tim Dunne, 
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for example, rightly highlighted the ‘fundamental incompatibility between Atlanticism and 
internationalism’ in British foreign policy.18 Britain’s broadly solidarist view of international 
moral responsibility,
19
 meanwhile, underlines the conflict between its commitments to liberal 
interventionism and to upholding the status quo.
20
 
McCourt rightly notes that most politicians use ‘Britain’s role in the world’ as a rhetorical 
device to challenge one another’s legitimacy rather than as an analytical tool to shape foreign 
policy.
21
 Simply by arguing over role conceptions, however, MPs introduce an element of 
‘role contestation’ into the policy-making process. Role contestation arises when domestic 
elites disagree over the international roles their state should adopt.
22
 Thanks to their 
involvement in military deployment decisions, MPs now have a credible claim to foreign 
policy influence. Whether they use the concept of roles as an analytical device, or purely 
rhetorically, is irrelevant. As soon as they start discussing role conceptions they engage in 
contestation, at least potentially limiting how far Britain can assume particular roles at the 
international level. From a role theory perspective, although parliament’s war powers concern 
military deployment decisions specifically and not foreign policy-making more generally, 
any impact its debates on military action have on Britain’s national role conceptions should 
matter more widely.  
None of the speakers in the Syria debate referred directly to Britain’s role in the world. 
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg came closest by asking ‘What kind of nation are we?’ 
during his closing speech. But he then took a question on chemical weapons, and never 
picked up the thread.
23
 A close reading of the debate nevertheless draws out three ways in 
which MPs’ arguments indirectly questioned established British roles, especially three of 
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Gaskarth’s conceptions, which we may render in slightly different terms as ‘status quo 
power’, ‘liberal interventionist’ and ‘faithful ally’. The following paragraphs set out these 
challenges. 
Britain as a status quo power 
Gaskarth’s ‘influential’ role conception framed Britain as a state committed to upholding 
international law and order.
24
 MPs raised two issues with this image during the Syria debate. 
First, they questioned what exactly upholding international law and order entailed. 
Specifically, they disagreed over whether major powers should wait for UN Security Council 
approval before enforcing international law. Some took a hard pro-UN line. Caroline Lucas 
(Green) and George Galloway (Respect) insisted that only the UN could approve military 
action. Most preferred a more nuanced approach. They recognized that bypassing the 
Security Council undermined international order; but they pointed to the legacy of the League 
of Nations to argue that such action might be necessary if the Council failed to respond to 
state-sponsored atrocities. Former Conservative Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and 
former Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Menzies Campbell both made this 
argument. Even Labour leader Ed Miliband agreed. He insisted Britain ‘should strain every 
sinew’ to make the UN process work. But he refused to rule out acting without Security 
Council approval if necessary.
25
 
Second, MPs argued over the more fundamental question of whether Britain should accept 
responsibility for maintaining international order. Richard Ottaway (Con.), for example, 
thought Britain should meet ‘the expectations that the world community has of us’. His 
fellow Conservative James Arbuthnot, by contrast, warned against acting ‘as the international 
policeman’, noting that ‘when we have done so in the past, the world has not tended to thank 
us’. Several speakers complained about regional powers’ failure to resolve the Syrian 
situation themselves. Sarah Wollaston, another Conservative, wondered why Britain was 
‘arming all these nations to the teeth’ if they remained unable to act independently.26 Most 
MPs recognized that foreign states expected Britain to play a ‘status quo’ role. Many 
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doubted, however, that those same states were willing to tolerate military expressions of this 
role, and most thought Britain would be left exposed if it acted without regional support.  
These arguments complicated Britain’s claim to international influence. They also cast doubt 
over a role conception not previously much debated among decision-makers. MPs did not 
just bring new perspectives to this dimension of the broader debate over British foreign 
policy; they problematized an area policy-makers (and, presumably, their counterparts 
overseas) thought settled. 
Britain as a liberal interventionist power 
Gaskarth’s ‘opportunist–interventionist’ role conception highlighted Britain’s efforts ‘to 
advance liberal ideas about human rights, democracy and good governance, even at the 
expense of existing frameworks of international law’.27 It closely mirrored Tony Blair’s 
‘doctrine of international community’ set out during the Kosovo conflict in 1999.28 Before 
taking office, Cameron promised a less activist ‘liberal conservative’ approach.29 In power, 
however, he intervened abroad more frequently than Blair.
30
 During the Syria debate, some 
speakers questioned the underlying morality of liberal intervention. Gerald Kaufman (Lab.), 
for example, labelled western efforts to spread democracy and human rights little more than 
‘random, murderous activity’.31 Although, by contrast, several MPs claimed Britain had a 
‘responsibility to protect’ Syrian civilians, the government did not. Ministers were 
constrained, as Caroline Lucas highlighted, by the Security Council having reserved the 
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exclusive right to decide when the doctrine known as R2P (Responsibility to Protect) 
applied.
32
 Britain could not simultaneously uphold the status quo and pursue liberal 
interventionism, a broader role conflict MPs left unresolved. 
Many of the doubts MPs expressed about liberal interventionism turned on negative 
memories of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Though Cameron warned against letting ‘the spectre 
of previous mistakes paralyse our ability to stand up for what is right’, several speakers did 
exactly that. David Lammy (Lab.), for example, warned that the Iraq had shown that ‘liberal 
intervention can fail—and it can fail badly’.33 He did not reject the interventionist role 
entirely—indeed, few participants in the debate went that far; but many had clearly been 
burned by earlier experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. They preferred a more ‘small-
c’ conservative approach than the one Cameron put forward. Cameron’s own efforts to 
combine liberalism and greater international caution showed that the liberal interventionist 
role conception was already contested before the Syria vote. Parliament’s doubts further 
limited how far Britain could act internationally in line with it.  
Britain as faithful ally to the United States 
Gaskarth’s ‘Great Power’ role conception was based strongly on Britain’s claim to a ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States.34 Holsti’s original article described how a ‘faithful ally’ 
state makes ‘a specific commitment to supporting the policies of another government’.35 
Successive generations of British leaders sought to gain influence in Washington by 
demonstrating their reliability, especially through giving military support to the United States 
in the latter’s own role as ‘global policeman’. They were only partially successful. Britain’s 
contribution to US management of the international system is neither crucial nor unique.
36
 It 
is more useful politically, as proof that America is not acting unilaterally, than it is 
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militarily.
37
 This is why Dunne found Britain ‘could influence only the timing, not the 
content, of decisions’ made in Washington.38 
When it came to Syria, however, Britain seemed unable even to influence the timing of US 
decision-making. In an ominous echo of debates over Iraq, MPs chafed at being summoned 
back to parliament early to meet what many believed was an arbitrary US deadline for air 
strikes. Cameron insisted: ‘Our actions will not be determined by my good friend and ally the 
American President; they will be decided by this Government and votes in this House of 
Commons.’ But Miliband and his Shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas Alexander attacked the 
government for following ‘a timetable set elsewhere’. Some MPs, meanwhile, challenged US 
policy directly. Both Paul Flynn (Lab.) and Edward Leigh (Con.) called President Obama 
‘foolish’ for getting drawn into Syria in the first place. Malcolm Bruce (Lib. Dem.) thought 
Obama had been ‘naïve’ to set a ‘red line’ over the use of chemical weapons.39 Truly faithful 
allies do not quibble over timetables or question basic strategy. Parliament did. In the process 
it undermined Britain’s commitment to the role of faithful ally to the United States. 
Consequences 
Similar points arose during the ISIS debate just over a year after the Syria vote. For the most 
part, MPs raised the same three role conceptions, though they treated each somewhat more 
favourably than on the earlier occasion. Ed Miliband argued that Britain should uphold a 
‘world order governed by rules’ and that this meant ‘protecting a democratic state’, namely 
Iraq, from threat by a non-state organization such as ISIS.
40
 Some MPs who had previously 
doubted that Britain should accept significant overseas responsibilities softened once regional 
powers made meaningful military contributions. Hugh Bayley (Lab.), for example, refused to 
‘shoulder the burden’ of intervention in Syria. But he thought Britain should ‘contribute to 
global security and not be a passive consumer of security provided by others’ when it came to 
fighting ISIS.
41
 
Several MPs thought Britain had a moral duty to protect Iraqi civilians. As Greg Mulholland 
(Lib. Dem.) put it: ‘We simply cannot turn a blind eye to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the 
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most appalling sorts of religious persecution we have seen since, frankly, the concentration 
camps.’ Jeremy Corbyn (Lab.) raised a lonely voice of dissent, complaining of double 
standards inherent in the West’s tolerance of Saudi human rights violations.42 He notably did 
not reject the ‘liberal’ aspect of ‘liberal interventionism’, only its selective application. Some 
‘small-c’ conservatism remained. Peter Hain (Lab.) attributed the fighting in Iraq to earlier 
‘cowboy western intervention’, while Edward Leigh (Con.) complained that ‘the British 
Government are indirectly culpable in fostering the conditions for jihadism’. But pro-
intervention speakers turned this observation on its head. As Miliband put it: ‘There is a 
heightened responsibility for us precisely because we did intervene in Iraq.’43 
MPs debating fighting ISIS proved far more willing to follow the United States than those 
debating Syria{4}. Former Cabinet Minister Ken Clarke (Con.), for example, supported 
intervention ‘because some of our best allies are taking part’, having previously showed his 
commitment to Britain’s allies when abstaining from the Syria vote. Gerald Howarth (Con.) 
thought it ‘very important that we should be standing alongside our friends in the United 
States; they are our closest ally’. Some, though, still contested Britain’s role as ‘faithful ally’. 
Paul Flynn (Lab.), for example, asked: ‘Why cannot we become independent in our foreign 
policy?’44 But these arguments were less extensive and less intense, with consequently less 
effect. 
Even so, the debate on Syria probably did damage Britain’s status as ‘faithful ally’ to the 
United States. To a degree this was inevitable, for the ‘faithful ally’ role sets a very high bar: 
as soon as a state expresses any sort of independence it immediately deviates from Holsti’s 
model. Pro-intervention commentators fretted about what the Syria veto meant for US–UK 
relations. The Sun, for example, announced the end of the ‘special relationship’ with a front-
page ‘death notice’.45 But domestic role contestation does not automatically alter national 
roles. For a fundamental role shift to occur, other states must agree; and US policy-makers 
seemed fairly sanguine about parliament’s veto. The US Ambassador in London, Matthew 
Barzun, and Secretary of State John Kerry both quickly insisted after the vote that the 
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transatlantic alliance remained strong.
46
 It helped that disagreeing with the White House is 
not the same thing as disagreeing with the United States as a nation:
47
 Congress, for example, 
showed no more enthusiasm than parliament for intervention in Syria.
48
 At the same time, 
however, Obama responded to the British veto by heaping praise on the ‘renewed’ Franco-
US alliance.
49
 His  notable decision not to wait for British assistance before striking ISIS in 
Iraq suggested that there were at least some grounds for concern. 
Even if parliament’s function as a site for domestic role contestation has affected Britain’s 
ability to claim certain roles coherently, this is not necessarily a negative development. Nor 
does it inevitably point towards a fundamental shift in in is foreign policy stance. Both the 
‘liberal interventionist’ and ‘faithful ally’ role conceptions only really gained prominence 
under Tony Blair.
50
 We might treat parliament’s willingness to contest both as a natural 
corrective, shifting the country away from an unpopular willingness to follow the United 
States into war zones, and back towards a less forceful approach to upholding international 
order based on law, the UN and diplomacy. Many other states would welcome such a shift,
51
 
and Britain has successfully adjusted its overall stance before without, for example, 
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abandoning its claim to Great Power status.
52
 Even this suggestion raises difficulties, 
however, because MPs disagree over the meaning of international order. Whether they 
disagree in order to score political points or because they genuinely conceive of Britain’s 
proper role in the world differently does not matter. During debates over military deployment 
decisions, parliament serves as a site for role contestation which confuses the stance the 
country presents to the world. This, in turn, potentially limits the coherence of British foreign 
policy-making overall.  
Parliament as a forum for policy debate 
Parliament is well equipped to serve as a forum for foreign policy debate. It already fulfils 
this function for domestic legislation. While not every MP who spoke on Syria said 
something about Britain’s role in the world, most commented on the specific merits of the 
government’s proposal. They employed three main criteria. First, they asked whether the use 
of force was actually necessary. Specifically, they doubted the evidence the government 
presented showing the Assad regime was responsible for the use of chemical weapons against 
civilians in Damascus. Distrust bred during debates over Iraq led many to speak out against 
the case for a further military engagement based primarily on evidence from secret 
intelligence. Second, they questioned whether ministers possessed ‘right authority’ to order 
intervention. Specifically, they expressed a more general lack of trust in official judgements, 
pointed to the absence of clear UN Security Council approval and highlighted the scale of 
public opposition. Finally, they worried about whether military action would succeed. Some 
thought the proposed intervention too small to make a difference. Others feared British 
entanglement and ‘mission creep’. Across all three criteria, MPs found the government’s 
plans wanting. This helps us understand why they vetoed intervention in Syria. It also points 
to the way in which parliament’s function as a forum for debating specific military 
deployments interacts with British foreign policy more generally. 
Necessity 
MPs repeatedly questioned whether it was actually necessary for outside forces to intervene 
in Syria. While there was plenty of public evidence showing someone carried out a chemical 
attack on 20 August, none of it proved the Assad regime was responsible. UN weapons 
inspectors were still working at the apparent attack site, though they promised only to 
confirm that chemical weapons had been used, not who had used them. The government gave 
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MPs a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report concluding that it was ‘highly likely’ the 
regime was responsible, and that ‘there are no plausible alternative scenarios’.53 But MPs 
were sceptical. Jack Straw summed up the problem, noting that ‘one of the consequences of 
the intelligence failure on Iraq has been to raise the bar that we have to get over when the 
question of military action arises’. Several critics homed in on the JIC’s failure to identify a 
motive for the attacks. George Galloway, for example, argued: ‘It is not that the regime is not 
bad enough to do it; everybody knows that it is bad enough to do it. The question is: is it mad 
enough to do it?’54 MPs seem particularly suspicious of secret intelligence, perhaps because 
they cannot verify it independently. Some will believe the opposite of whatever ministers say 
if they offer only evidence not otherwise in the public domain. Several agreed with Diane 
Abbott (Lab.), who asked ‘Who benefits?’ from western intervention in Syria, and concluded 
it was the Syrian opposition.
55
 They ignored official assurances that the opposition lacked the 
capacity to deliver an attack of the sort apparently seen in Damascus. Without being able to 
rely on intelligence evidence, ministers found it impossible to convince MPs of the necessity 
of intervention.  
Authority 
MPs questioned the government’s authority in three ways during the Syria debate. Several, 
mindful of alleged government dishonesty during the Iraq debate tens year before, distrusted 
ministerial arguments on principle. Roger Godsiff (Lab.), for example, said he ‘would never 
again believe one single solitary assurance given by any Prime Minister’. Cheryl Gillan 
(Con.) declared her refusal to ‘sit here and be duped again’. A number of MPs thought the 
UN Security Council, rather than the British government, should decide when military action 
was required to uphold international order. Caroline Lucas told Cameron that, in her view, 
‘without explicit UN Security Council reinforcement, military action simply would not be 
legal under international law’.56 The government offered a further memo, this time from the 
Attorney-General, supporting its legal position. But, as with the JIC memo, it convinced few 
MPs. Finally, some speakers pointed out that just 22 per cent of opinion poll respondents 
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favoured British intervention.
57
 Cameron only too evidently did not have the country behind 
him, which further undermined his authority.  
Parliament’s questions about government authority during the Syria debate raised broader 
difficulties for British foreign policy. MPs, mindful of Tony Blair’s apparent dishonesty over 
Iraq, no longer trust ministers. They seem to think international organizations have greater 
legitimacy than their own government when it comes to decisions about military 
interventions{5}. If parliament dislikes a particular proposal, meanwhile, public qualms 
reinforce its opposition. Together these doubts undermine the government’s claim to foreign 
policy authority. They limit how far ministers can propose military action simply because 
they, as elected leaders, consider it in the national interest or in the interest of the wider 
world. This inhibition links back to the procedural dimension of parliamentary war powers. A 
prime minister might be able to bypass parliament legally; but he or she will struggle to do so 
legitimately. 
MPs now expect ministers to prove the threats they describe exist, that their actions will not 
undermine the international order they claim to uphold, and that the public supports their 
proposals. Ministers can expect no deference to the fact they hold information MPs lack. In 
fact, MPs are particularly loath to support proposals based on secret information (whether 
intelligence evidence or legal advice), because they do not trust ministers to reflect it 
accurately. This reflects a significant loss of government authority, a major reason why MPs 
demanded a vote on military deployments in the first place.  
Success 
Several MPs thought military intervention in Syria simply would not work. Possibly in part 
because they doubted the government’s authority, as Anthony Lang suggests,58 very few 
accepted that punishing the Assad regime for using chemical weapons was a viable or 
legitimate objective. MPs thought the proposed goals of intervention both too limited and too 
vague, and dangerous on both counts. Cameron said any strikes would be ‘solely about 
deterring and degrading the future use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime—full stop, 
end of story’. He did not propose to end the civil war or protect civilians from conventional 
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attacks. Dai Havard (Lab.) called this ‘nonsense and a ridiculous proposition’. Britain should 
either intervene properly or not get involved at all. Michael Meacher (Lab.) warned that 
‘surgical’ strikes often go astray, while ‘limited’ military campaigns frequently escalate. 
Some speakers worried specifically about ‘mission creep’. Julian Lewis (Con.) warned that 
the region was ‘a powder keg, and we should not be lobbing weapons into the heart of such 
combustible material’. Diane Abbott thought the government had ‘no idea of what victory 
would look like’, and so ultimately no possibility of achieving it. 
No government can promise military action will succeed. It is apparently quite difficult to 
avoid mission creep. MPs find both issues troubling. Cameron’s inability to answer several of 
their more critical questions on this front did not help his case. He found himself caught 
between two poles and unable to extricate himself. Either his intervention would be too small 
to make a difference on the ground, or it would be large enough to get British troops 
embroiled in a messy civil war with few clear objectives and no end in sight. 
Consequences 
As with its role contestation function, parliament also operated as a forum for policy debate 
when the government proposed sending British forces back to Iraq in September 2014. Few 
MPs doubted the necessity of action against ISIS. This time, ministers did not need to rely on 
intelligence evidence. MPs could watch YouTube videos of ISIS fighters with London 
accents beheading captives, including British civilian aid workers. Now Cameron found it 
much easier to claim the authority to order an attack. Acting against ISIS meant assisting a 
sovereign government asking for help, not attacking one denying any wrongdoing. Over half 
(57 per cent) of poll respondents wanted Britain to join the United States and regional allies 
in launching air strikes.
59
 He only really struggled when it came to the third point of objection 
identified above: again, some MPs thought the action Cameron proposed too small to make a 
meaningful difference. Edward Leigh (Con.), for example, called it ‘gesture politics’. Others, 
such as veteran Dennis Skinner (Lab.), warned of inevitable ‘mission creep’. Most wound up 
with Frank Dobson (Lab.), however. ‘The odds look as though we will not succeed,’ he 
concluded, ‘yet I find that I am probably going to vote for the motion.’60 On this occasion, 
necessity and authority proved sufficient to win parliament’s approval.  
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Subjecting military deployment decisions to parliamentary scrutiny makes them more 
democratic. It could also improve their substance. The fact governments know they have to 
debate their decisions publicly should encourage them to spend as much time and effort as 
possible getting things right before involving MPs. At the same time, however, the Syria 
debate shows how parliamentary deliberations over military action affect British foreign 
policy overall. By challenging and possibly countermanding government decisions, MPs can 
bring further incoherence to Britain’s external stance beyond that caused by their role 
contestation efforts. They do not negotiate directly with foreign leaders, so that differences 
must be aired in public rather than resolved in private. They also do not behave consistently 
from one proposal to the next. Different individual MPs speak in different debates: 61 spoke 
on Syria, 58 on ISIS, but only 23 on both. Individuals also change their minds. Nearly a 
hundred (96) MPs spoke in one or both debates; less than half of them (41) voted consistently 
either for or against government policy. Most were Labour MPs who followed their leader, 
opposing action in Syria and supporting action against ISIS. But some, like Tory grandee 
Kenneth Clarke, simply saw the two questions differently. These issues are likely to recur 
and grow more acute if MPs successfully use their veto over military deployments as a lever 
to gain greater parliamentary influence over foreign policy decision-making more generally.  
Chris Brown defended the ‘inconsistency’ in a state’s willingness to use force overseas that 
results from an ad hoc, contextual approach to decision-making.
61
 But the inconsistency 
parliament introduces goes far beyond the sort of commonsense stance Brown praised. For 
example, it brings the executive and legislative branches of British government into conflict, 
causing public ructions within the institutions of the state itself. And even Brown’s fairly 
mild form of inconsistency can be damaging for a country that typically pursues major 
international initiatives in conjunction with military allies and regional partners. Christopher 
Coker once aptly presented Britain’s ‘fundamental dependability’, especially to the United 
States, as a critical strategic asset capable of mitigating its relative material decline.
62
 More 
recently, Henry Kissinger has warned that ‘in international affairs a reputation for reliability 
is a more important asset than demonstrations of tactical cleverness’.63 MPs may have been 
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right to veto action in Syria. The proposal was badly thought through and not terribly 
coherent. But in the process they cast doubt on Britain’s internal foreign policy consistency, 
and so on its external reliability. Parliamentary policy debates, like parliamentary role 
contestation, make Britain’s approach to international affairs more democratic and potentially 
more rational. They also make it less consistent and potentially less effective as a result. 
Parliament as a political institution 
Parliament’s role contestation and policy debate functions both contributed to making the 
Syria veto possible. But neither directly determined the outcome of the vote. Most MPs did 
not speak in the debate on 29 August 2013. Roughly 10 per cent of those in principle eligible 
to speak actually did so. The vast majority of MPs did vote, though; and, crucially, most of 
those who voted followed party lines. Cameron needed to win the argument over Syria, to 
shore up his own preferred role conceptions and to legitimize the decision to use force. But 
only a handful of ‘undecided’ votes were ever up for grabs in the House of Commons 
chamber itself. To get his proposal approved, he needed to strike two distinct political 
bargains. At the intraparty level, Cameron worked to maintain the support of his own 
backbenchers. Knowing this was going to be difficult, he also sought at the interparty level to 
get the Labour opposition on board. He failed on both counts.  
Intraparty bargaining 
It is a simple fact of parliamentary democracy that majority governments have more to fear 
from their own backbenchers than they do from opposition parties who cannot, by definition, 
vote them out of office without help. This was why Tony Blair spent far less time wooing 
Conservatives over Iraq than he did trying to secure Labour Party support. The Conservatives 
could not defeat him, whereas Labour rebels could. Cameron faced a harder task in 2013 over 
Syria because he led a coalition. He not only needed to keep his fellow Conservatives on 
side, he also needed Liberal Democrat support just to retain his majority. Even in the light of 
these tougher odds, however, Cameron performed badly. Perhaps lulled into a false sense of 
security by the easy passage of the vote on intervention in Libya in 2011, he failed to do his 
political homework properly. He realized only after recalling parliament that many 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs did not support an immediate intervention. Even 
after he significantly moderated his proposals, 39 Conservatives and 17 Liberal Democrats 
still withheld their support, eliminating his majority and leaving him reliant on Labour votes. 
Prime ministers used to be able to discipline recalcitrant backbenchers by designating a vote 
on a controversial issue a matter of confidence in the government.
64
 This meant any 
government MPs voting against it were also voting their colleagues out of office, and 
potentially risking their own jobs at the following election. Although he never said as much 
explicitly, Tony Blair strongly implied that he would treat the Iraq vote as a judgement on his 
own continuation in office, warning Labour MPs who preferred that Britain sit out the US-led 
invasion: ‘I will not be party to such a course.’65 They could keep Blair or save Saddam, but 
they could not do both. The Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 removed this power.
66
 
Cameron could not discipline rebels with the spectre of a snap general election, as Blair and 
others among his predecessors had done. This meant he did not have to resign after losing the 
vote. But the possibility of the government falling probably would have won him additional 
support, and he only needed a handful of rebels to change stance. 
Interparty bargaining 
Cameron also faced a tougher task when it came to winning opposition support. Labour 
traditionally opposes military action, while the Conservatives traditionally support it. In Iain 
Duncan Smith, Blair faced an opposition leader even keener to invade Iraq than he was. 
Cameron, by contrast, had to offer to wait for a UN report and to hold a further parliamentary 
vote to get Labour backing for his Syria strategy. Then, on the day of the debate, Ed Miliband 
moved an amendment subtly weakening the government motion. Both he and Douglas 
Alexander blamed briefings from Downing Street for Labour’s late opposition. They claimed 
spokesmen told journalists that a ‘yes’ vote meant ‘in principle’ approval for military action 
that could start almost immediately, contradicting Cameron’s promise to wait. This argument 
proved particularly damaging to the legitimacy of the government proposal because it fuelled 
MPs’ existing suspicions about the timing of the vote. Joan Ruddock (Lab.), for example, 
interrupted Cameron to suggest ‘that this House has been recalled in order to give cover for 
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possible military action this weekend’, despite the motion’s clear promise of a further debate 
before any actual strike took place.
67
 A whole series of backbenchers asked Nick Clegg, 
wrapping up for the government, to confirm the government would not use a ‘yes’ vote as 
cover for immediate intervention. Each time he confirmed as much, they asked again. They 
simply did not believe him. 
For all the party leaders tried to talk up their differences, they put forward near-identical 
policy proposals. If parliamentary votes depended primarily on role conceptions or on 
individual judgements, many MPs should have voted consistently in both Syria votes, on the 
government motion and on the opposition amendment. That they did not suggests that 
political considerations proved more significant on this occasion. A handful of MPs opposed 
military action under any circumstances, and voted accordingly. Jim Fitzpatrick (Lab.), for 
example, concluded he could only be ‘honest and consistent’ by voting against both the 
motion and the amendment.
68
 A further 46 MPs joined him in both ‘no’ lobbies, while 
another 30 abstained on one vote (usually the one put forward by their own party) and voted 
no on the other. What really cost Cameron was the fact that no one voted for both proposals. 
Labour MPs Meg Munn and Pat McFadden both vocally supported intervention during the 
debate; Munn did not vote at all, while McFadden voted against the government. Menzies 
Campbell could ‘find no difference of substance or principle anywhere in the two 
offerings’;69 yet he still voted along party lines. Just under 90 per cent of voting MPs did the 
same. The result was striking: 575 MPs voted in one or both divisions; 492 voted for either 
the government motion or the opposition amendment. Neither passed, even though they were 
essentially the same. With a hard core of rebels determined to oppose any possibility of 
military action, and the majority divided along party lines, neither government nor opposition 
secured majority support, despite the fact that most MPs supported some version of the policy 
proposed.  
Consequences 
Parliamentary involvement in decisions about military action politicizes the most dramatic 
expression of British foreign policy. It forces policy-makers to pursue intraparty and 
interparty bargains to get the use of force overseas approved. This process, ironically, makes 
parliamentary decision-making less directly democratic. Blair won the vote on Iraq 
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comfortably because he secured both intraparty and interparty support, despite high levels of 
public opposition in the weeks preceding the start of the campaign. Cameron resolved to fight 
ISIS in Iraq but not in Syria to secure Ed Miliband’s support. Public opinion, as recorded in 
the polls, and several speakers in the ISIS debate thought this restriction unnecessary and 
absurd.
70
 
Parliamentary politicking damages prime ministerial credibility, and this has knock-on 
consequences abroad. If the British government threatens military action, its allies and 
enemies know its ability to follow through depends not just on prime ministerial resolve but 
also on partisan bargaining. A British prime minister’s ability to keep his promises 
internationally now depends far more heavily on his command of the political environment at 
home. This might contribute to a further erosion of allied states’ faith in Britain’s ability to 
follow through on its commitments, not just in the military sphere but also more generally.  
Conclusion 
The outcome of the Syria vote was largely determined by the dynamics of political 
bargaining. David Cameron lost because he lost Labour support, and because he failed to co-
opt sufficient Conservative and Liberal Democrat backbenchers; because his aides briefed too 
aggressively, and because Ed Miliband seized the opportunity to undermine the government 
while burnishing his own left-wing credentials. Cameron could have compromised. He could 
have accepted the Labour amendment. The positions the two sides put forward were not 
exactly identical, but they were probably close enough. Cameron, however, tried to win 
without depending on Miliband. This turned out to be an error. 
While politics proved decisive on this occasion, this article has also shown that parliament’s 
functions as a site for role contestation and as a forum for policy debate affect both specific 
decisions about military deployments and more general considerations surrounding British 
foreign policy. After a brief foray into being an uncritical ‘faithful ally’ under Tony Blair, 
Britain seems to have shifted back towards a broadly supportive but more independent 
stance, as signalled by parliament’s veto of military action in Syria. US policy-makers know 
they can probably still rely on British political support; but they have learned not to assume 
that Britain will join every US-led military campaign. President Obama’s decision not to wait 
for British help before striking ISIS, but to welcome its participation a few weeks into the 
campaign, underlines this point. Britain has not become a pacifist state. The ISIS vote, and 
the supportive poll results accompanying it, demonstrate as much. Nevertheless, the public 
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and parliament alike will back military action only if they think it is consistent with a fairly 
conservative account of Britain’s global role, if it looks both necessary and justifiable under 
international law, and if they think it will work. 
These developments make British foreign policy more democratic. Democracy can be a 
useful strategic asset. It lends legitimacy to government decisions. It might also, as discussed 
above, help improve the quality of policy-making. Yet too much democracy is problematic 
from a foreign policy perspective. Parliament does not behave as a single unitary actor: 
different MPs express different (and sometimes contradictory) views on different occasions. 
This makes Britain’s approach to the use of force overseas inconsistent. Parliament is willing 
to contradict the government publicly, and even to veto major military deployments that have 
already been announced, as was the case with the Syria vote. This makes Britain’s approach 
to the use of force overseas incoherent. Inconsistency and incoherence matter internationally 
because they make Britain less reliable. There are still important procedural ambiguities 
around parliamentary war powers, though each time MPs vote on the use of force they 
reinforce the convention and clarify additional points. Cameron recalled the House in August 
2013, for example, because William Hague promised during the Libya debate that in future 
MPs would always have the opportunity to vote before the start of military action. By treating 
parliament as a site for role contestation, a forum for policy debate and an arena for political 
bargaining, we can perhaps move a step closer to understanding what parliamentary war 
powers mean in substantive terms. 
